Innocence Lost: Simulation Scenarios: Prospects and Consequences by Dainton, Barry Francis
Innocence Lost 
 
Simulation Scenarios: Prospects and Consequences 
 
 
Barry Dainton (2002, October), The University of Liverpool 
 
 
Abstract 
Those who believe suitably programmed computers could enjoy conscious 
experience of the sort we enjoy must accept the possibility that their own 
experience is being generated as part of a computerized simulation.  It would be a 
mistake to dismiss this is just one more radical sceptical possibility: for as 
Bostrom has recently noted, if advances in computer technology were to continue 
at close to present rates, there would be a strong probability that we are each 
living in a computer simulation.   The first part of this paper is devoted to 
broadening the scope of the argument: even if computers cannot sustain 
consciousness (as many dualists and materialists believe), there may still be a 
strong likelihood that we are living simulated lives.  The implications of this 
result are the focus of the second part of the paper.  The topics discussed include: 
the Doomsday argument, scepticism, the different modes of virtual life, 
transcendental idealism, the Problem of Evil, and simulation ethics. 
 
 
1. The Simulation Menace 
 
Imagine participating in a simple experiment.  You are watching pre-recorded scenes 
from a televised soap opera unfold on a monitor in front of you; at the same time, in 
different rooms, nine other people are doing likewise.  Or at least, they believe they are.  
In fact, only one of the screens is showing the original film featuring real actors; nine 
screens are showing a computer-generated film.  The simulation is very good; so good, in 
fact, that the computer-generated images are visually indistinguishable from the originals.  
As is clear, if you had nothing but the onscreen images to go by, then (i) you would not 
be able to tell whether the people you are watching were real or computer-generated, and 
(ii) the odds that you are watching the film featuring real rather than virtual people are 
only one in ten. 
 Now consider an analogous case.  As things stand, our abilities to create and 
control human streams of consciousness are severely limited.  Let us suppose that in the 
future this changes, and it becomes possible to create human-type streams of 
consciousness, of any length, with any desired characteristics, very easily.  Call the 
succession of streams which jointly compose the consciousness of a single person from 
birth until death, a life-stream.  Despite their differences, your life-stream and mine, are 
of a certain general type: early 21st century human.  Let us call these ‘type-21 streams’.  
Now suppose that, for whatever reason, in the future very large numbers of type-21 
streams will be created.  To be more specific, suppose the total number of type-21 
streams which exist after the year 2100 is ten times greater than the number which 
existed in the 21st century itself.   
This scenario places you in a similar predicament as the first, but the 
consequences are rather more perturbing.  Are you in a position to tell whether your 
experience is real or artificially generated?  No.  What are the odds that your experience 
is occurring when appears to be, in the early 21st century?  Only one in ten.  Although it 
seems to you that you are a normal human being living at the start of the 21st century, the 
subjects of all the many artificially produced type-21 streams have very similar 
impressions and beliefs.  These subjects are all mistaken, and so might you be, for it is 
more likely than not that you are one of these subjects.  
 Following Bostrom, I will call this line of reasoning the Simulation Argument.1   
Although not everyone will find the possibility that their current lives are simulations 
something to be dreaded,2 at the very least the argument threatens complacent 
assumptions about the status of our lives, and for this reason I shall sometimes refer to 
the simulation menace or threat.  Many will no doubt be inclined to dismiss the argument 
as a mildly diverting but ultimately unthreatening curiosity, and for what might seem to 
be good reasons: 
 
Could it be done?  The notion that future generations, or future civilizations, will 
be able to manipulate consciousness in the ways required is wildly implausible. 
 
Would anyone bother? Even if the required technology were to become available, 
our descendants would surely have better things to do than waste their time and 
energy producing realistic simulations of 21st century lives, at least in the vast 
numbers required for their existence to pose a significant threat to us. 
 
In what follows I will argue that these objections carry less weight than might be 
supposed.  Having established that the Simulation Argument should be treated with 
respect, I will move on to consider some of the implications of this. 
2. Practicalities 
 
I shall be using ‘simulation’ in a very broad way: any state or episode of consciousness is 
to be regarded as simulated if it is produced by non-standard methods in a controlled 
fashion (the degree of control may vary).  Simulated experiences are of course real 
experiences in their own right, and while a simulated episode of consciousness may be a 
re-creation of an original non-simulated stretch of conscious life, it need not be.  I shall 
say that a life (or part of a life) is virtual rather than real if it is entirely composed of 
simulated experiences.   
Consciousness can be simulated in different ways, and to different degrees, and it 
will prove useful to have some of these differences in view before proceeding.     
So far as degree or depth of simulation is concerned, we can contrast complete 
with partial simulations.  The manufactured type-21 streams we encountered above are 
                                                 
1 See Bostrom (2002b), and also the resources available at www.simulation-argument.com. 
2 E.g. S.R.L. Clark (1983). 
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examples of complete simulations: every part and aspect of experience is being generated 
by artificial means.  In partial simulations, only some parts or aspects of experience are 
generated by artificial means.  A simulation in which a subject is supplied with a wholly 
virtual environment (which here can be taken to include all forms of bodily experience) 
but retains their original psychology is one form of partial simulation.  But we can also 
envisage cases in which the tampering is restricted to the domain of inner experience.  
Imagine having your psychology (e.g. memories, beliefs, desires, language skills, 
personality traits, and so on) replaced with a replica of Napoleon’s, and then waking up 
in your own bed and perceiving your environment in the usual way.  In what follows, 
unless otherwise stated, we will be concerned with complete rather than partial 
simulations.3 
 As for the ways in which consciousness can be simulated, it is important to 
distinguish what I will call hard (or H-simulations) from soft (or S-simulations).  H-
simulations result from directly tampering with the neural hardware ordinarily 
responsible for producing experience.  S-simulations are streams of consciousness 
generated by running programs (software) on computers (other than the brain, if the brain 
is nothing but a computer). 
 The following scenarios outline some ways in which both H-simulations and S-
simulations might exist in menacing numbers.  The scenarios may seem far-fetched (to 
us, at any rate).  Quite what we should make of them will be discussed in section 3. 
Modal Realism and Other Worlds 
 
According to the Modal Realist, all logically possible worlds are just as real as this one.  
Suppose David Lewis is right and Modal Realism is true.  Even if creating human-type 
streams of consciousness in the actual world will always be a haphazard and time-
consuming business, there are many logically possible worlds where this is not the case.  
There is, for example, a world which contains an infinite number of brains-in-vats, where 
each brain enjoys a recognizably human range of experiences.  An infinite number of 
these vat-subjects, we can suppose, have menacing type-21 streams of consciousness, and 
your life-stream and mine are replicated many times over.  Of course, this possible 
universe is not alone: there are infinitely many very much like it, differing only in the 
most trivial detail.  There are also many other possible universes where other methods of 
simulating human-style consciousness are to be found.  Suppose S-simulations are 
possible; if so, there are universes where every brain-generated consciousness is 
replicated by software running on computers.  Suppose something like Cartesian dualism 
is true, and mentality is not purely material.  It makes no difference: there are 
innumerable worlds, each containing innumerable disembodied immaterial souls, in 
which innumerable variants of type-21 streams of consciousness are instantiated.  
Needless to say, the subjects of these streams as completely unaware of their real 
predicament: they believe themselves to be embodied beings, living a normal life on 21st 
century Earth.   
                                                 
3 More discriminating distinctions can be drawn.  For example, it is possible for a subject to lead a virtual 
life – in the sense here defined – in the real world: think of the holo-doctor in Star Trek Voyager.  This sort 
of case will not be relevant to what follows, where we shall be concentrating on simulations in which what 
is ‘perceived’ is not the real world. 
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 If Modal Realism were true, the simulation menace would clearly be very real 
indeed.  As for the odds of having a virtual rather than a real life, the calculation is not 
straightforward.  Since there may well be an infinite number of worlds which are close 
replicas of (what we take to be) the actual world, there may well be an infinite number of 
worlds containing exact (or nearly exact) replicas of (what we take to be) our 21st century 
Earth.  If so, then since every simulated type-21 stream could be paired off with a real 
type-21 stream, it could be argued that real and simulated streams are equal in number.  
In which case, the one’s odds of one’s life being real rather than simulated are at best 
only fifty-fifty.   
 Modal Realism is not the only potential source of simulations-in-other-worlds: 
some of the ‘multiverse’ theories encountered in the more speculative reaches of 
contemporary physics may have similarly menacing implications.  Consider, for example, 
the kind of cosmos described by Smolin in which ‘each black hole is a bud that leads to a 
new universe’ (1997, 94).  The variants of this model which have no beginning or end in 
time comprise an infinite number of sub-universes of varying character.  A cosmos of this 
kind could easily contain an infinite number of Earth-like planets with Earth-like 
civilizations.  Even if only some of the latter generate simulated type-21 streams, it could 
still be possible to pair off every real type-21 stream with a simulated type-21 stream. 
 
S-Simulations 
 
If all logically possible worlds are real, menacing simulations in truly vast numbers will 
inevitably exist.  But even if only this world is real, menacing simulations may well exist 
in vast numbers – especially if S-simulations are possible. 
Speculations as to what computers might one day be capable of are commonplace, 
but Frank Tipler takes things a good deal further than most.  Tipler argues that if our 
descendants develop computers as far as they can be developed, given known physical 
constraints, we can all look forward to being resurrected in the far-future.  Intriguingly, 
he suggests that our resurrection will not depend on our descendants having detailed 
knowledge of what our lives were actually like.  The deduction runs thus: 
 
(1) The computational conception of the mind is true.  Any mental life, any 
stream of consciousness, can be replicated on a suitably programmed 
computer.   
(2) There total number of possible human-like streams of consciousness (of finite 
duration) is finite. 
(3) The processing power of the ‘universal computer’ that our descendants will 
develop will be effectively infinite. 
(4) The universal computer will easily be able to simulate every possible human 
stream of consciousness (of finite length).4 
(5) Hence our resurrection is all but inevitable: ‘The dead will be resurrected 
when the computer capacity of the universe is so large that the amount of 
                                                 
4 In fact, Tipler goes further.  It is not just minds that will be simulated: ‘an emulation of all possible 
variants of our world – the so-called visible universe – would require at most 1010123 bits of computer 
capacity … this amount of computer capacity will be available in the far future.’ (1994, 220) 
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capacity required to store all possible human simulations is an insignificant 
fraction of the entire capacity.’ (1994, 225)   
 
If the future turns out as Tipler predicts, the Simulation Argument has real bite: the 
probability that your life is a virtual life is extremely high.  As Tipler himself notes: 
‘How do we know we ourselves are not merely a simulation inside a gigantic computer?  
Obviously, we can’t know.’ (1994, 207) 
But Tipler’s scenario rests on a good many colossal ifs.  The future he describes 
may not be physically possible; even if it is, there is no reason to think it significantly 
likely that the future will turn out as he describes.  However, there are far more modest 
forecasts which do not suffer from these flaws, but whose implications viz à vis the 
simulation menace are much the same.   
If computer technology continues to advance at the rate it has for the past few 
decades, it will not belong before our most powerful computers equal, or exceed, the 
processing power and information storage capacity of a typical human brain.  According 
to one of the more optimistic guesstimates, supercomputers should cross this threshold as 
early as 2010, with desktop machines of similar power arriving by 2030.  A more 
conservative survey concludes that the breakthrough will certainly have been achieved by 
supercomputers around 2025, if present trends continue – and there is every reason to 
think they will.5  Once such hardware becomes available it will be possible to simulate 
the computational activity of a human brain.  Of course, this will require a fine-grained 
knowledge of our brains’ structure and workings, but it may well be that the required 
knowledge will gradually be accumulated over the next few decades; significant strides in 
this direction have already been taken.  On the assumption that mentality is a purely 
computational affair, computerized simulations of human brains could generate conscious 
mental lives that are subjectively indistinguishable from those generated by biological 
brains.  S-simulations of this kind could be possible within the next half century or so. 
A few such simulations pose no significant threat, but the situation becomes 
distinctly menacing if they start being produced by the billion or trillion.  Such a situation 
could develop in at least two ways.  The ability to produce menacing simulations could 
become very widespread, e.g., a hundred years from now everyone might own desktop 
(or handheld) computers easily capable of running them.  If several billion computers 
were to possess this capacity, even if it were utilized only occasionally, menacing 
simulations would soon exist in disturbingly large numbers.6  Alternatively, or in parallel, 
the capability of running large numbers of simulations might be found in the 
supercomputers of the not too far-distant future.  Bostrom provides a Tipleresque 
illustration of the potential dangers:  
 
                                                 
5 See Moravec (1999, 51-63).  Moravec estimates the computer power of a single retina to be around 1000 
MIPS (millions of instructions per second), which is about the power of a current PC.  Since an entire brain 
is about a hundred thousand times bigger than a retina, he estimates the computing power of a brain to be 
around 100 million MIPS.  Current supercomputers are capable of around 10 million MIPS.  For the 
slightly more cautious appraisal see Bostrom (1997).  Kurzweil is far more optimistic, arguing that a $1000 
unit of computation in 2029 will have the power of approximately 1,000 human brains (1999, 220). 
6 Consider the massive current popularity of the computer ‘God-game’ The Sims, and suppose the 
simulated inhabitants are fully conscious – as they might be, in computer games of the future. 
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a rough approximation of the computational power of a single planetary-mass 
computer is 1042 operations per second, and this assumes only already known 
nanotechnological designs, which are far from optimal.  Such a computer could 
simulate the entire mental history of humankind (call this an ancestor-simulation) 
in less than 10-7 seconds. (2002b, 3) 
 
Less powerful devices, of the sort which might be available in the comparatively near 
future, would take somewhat longer, but the lesson remains much the same.  If our 
descendants were able to run ancestor-simulations using only a small fraction of the 
computing resources available to them, they might very well do so, quite frequently.  In 
such circumstances were to obtain, the risk that you and I are inhabiting a computer 
simulation would be high.7 
 
H-Simulations 
 
There is a further source of menacing simulations, one that has received less attention.   
Many of us have experienced fully realistic hallucinations, whether drug-induced or in 
ordinary dreams.  Hallucinations produced by these means are typically uncontrolled: we 
cannot determine in advance the type of virtual world we will hallucinate, or the role we 
will play in the scenarios which unfold.  This may very well change.  Advances in brain 
science may make it possible to generate controlled hallucinations – or H-simulations –  
safely, easily and reliably.  Almost inevitably, some of these controlled hallucinations 
will constitute menacing simulations. 
  One route to H-simulations requires the kind of neural implant and human-
machine integration that is already familiar from science fiction.  Interacting with 
computers mechanically – using screens, keyboards, etc. – is a  cumbersome business, 
and a good deal of research is going into ways of facilitating the process.  Among the 
methods already being considered, at least by the more adventurous researchers, are 
methods of connecting computers directly to brains.  At present, such techniques are at a 
primitive stage of development, but this will no doubt change.8  A hundred years from 
now, children could be growing up with implants buried deep in their heads, implants that 
both track and keep pace with their neural development, and allow their minds to interact 
directly with computers, on a number of levels, in a variety of ways.   
It is not difficult to envisage some of the uses to which this sort of interface might 
be put.  Your thoughts could be transmitted directly into someone else’s mind – provided 
you were both hooked up to the same computer network.  Forgetfulness would be largely 
                                                 
7 There are other possibilities.  Egan (1995) provides this intriguing illustration of how a significant 
simulation menace might arise through S-simulations: ‘I was six years old when my parents told me that 
there was a small, dark, jewel inside my skull, learning to be me.  Microscopic spiders had woven a fine 
golden web through my brain, so that the jewel’s teacher could listen to the whisper of my thoughts.  The 
jewel itself eavesdropped on my senses, and read the chemical messages carried in my bloodstream; it saw, 
heard, smelt, tasted and felt the world exactly as I did …. I thought: if hearing that makes me feel strange 
and giddy, how must it make the jewel feel?  Exactly the same, I reasoned; it doesn’t know it’s the jewel, 
and it too wonders how the jewel must feel … - it too wonders whether it’s the real me, or whether in fact 
it’s only the jewel that’s learning to be me.’  The ‘jewel’ is a crystalline computer, programmed (in effect) 
by a living brain. 
8 See Nicolelis and Chapin (2002) for a useful survey of current work. 
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a thing of the past: your thoughts and experiences could easily be backed-up on a 
computer file, ready to be called on when required.  More relevant to our purposes, fully 
immersive virtual reality would also be a possibility.  There will be no need for you to 
wear a suit and visor to interact with machine-generated virtual worlds, your implants 
will perform the necessary tasks.  Your sensory experience will be directly machine-
controlled, via stimulation of the appropriate areas of the sensory cortex.  The movements 
of your (simulated) body through virtual environments will be under your control, but 
there will be no need for you to actually move your physical body: the ways you intend to 
move your body will be detected by implants in your motor cortex and elsewhere, and 
this information will be used to generate corresponding movements of your virtual body.  
It will be possible to have a fully realistic experience of (say) flying a plane through 
narrow mountain passes while remaining motionless on a couch.  You might even believe 
yourself to be an experienced pilot: your implants could ensure that a suitable set of false 
memories temporarily override your real memories.  Alternatively, you might believe 
yourself to be an ordinary 21st century person, leading a typical life in a (virtual) 21st 
century environment. 
If such technology were to be commonplace, it is by no means inconceivable that 
H-simulations would be generated in sufficient numbers so as to become menacing.  
People might take virtual reality ‘trips’ to the past quite frequently.  They would certainly 
be used on an occasional basis during history lessons, and more intensively by historians, 
amateur and professional, with a particular interest in what it was like to live during 
certain periods of the past.  But such trips might also be taken – far more frequently – for 
entertainment purposes.  The soap operas of the future might well have an 
immersive/interactive character their present-day counterparts lack, computer games 
likewise.  As is easily shown, the numbers soon add up. 
Our descendants may ‘visit’ the past quite frequently, but since few are likely to 
want to spend significant portions of their lives in H-simulations, the concept of a life-
stream introduced earlier is no longer appropriate as a basic unit of simulated 
consciousness.  Something of briefer duration is required.9  So, for present purposes, let 
us take day-long streams of uninterrupted consciousness – D-streams for short – as our 
working units.  (An even shorter unit could be selected, but as will become evident, the 
upshot would not be greatly different.)  We shall take as our class of menacing D-streams 
those simulated streams that resemble the sort of experiences enjoyed by actual 
inhabitants of the year 2002 – call these MD-streams.   
Assuming the current population of the Earth to be six billion, there are just over  
2 x 1012  D-streams for the year 2002.  If a similar number of MD-streams of varying 
character exist in the future, the odds of the experiences you are currently having being 
simulated rather than original are around fifty per cent.  Should the numbers of MD-
streams created in the future be greater, your chances of living among the original 
inhabitants of the year 2002 will be correspondingly smaller.   
In fact, the number of MD-streams created in the future could easily be far higher.  
Call the time at which H-simulations become commonplace occurrences the C-threshold.  
Let us suppose that from the C-threshold on, every future human being takes one virtual 
                                                 
9 I assume here that our descendants have life spans not too different from our own – if their lives were far 
longer, the change from life-streams to day-streams would not be needed (my thanks to Stephen Clark for 
this point). 
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reality trip to the year 2002 during their lifetime, and that these trips are varied in 
character.  If we now suppose that human civilization lasts for ten thousand generations 
after the C-threshold, and has an average population of ten billion, there will be 1.0 x 1014 
MD-streams, compared with 2 x 1012  original D-streams.  With fifty simulated streams 
for every real stream, you have a one in fifty chance of actually being alive in the year 
2002.  On more optimistic scenarios, your predicament is even more precarious.  If 
humankind has a long history – one million generations exist after the C-threshold, say, 
with constant or improving technology – and a larger average population during this 
period – a hundred billion, say – then we can expect a total of around 1.0 x 1017 MD-
streams to occur, which would reduce your chances of being alive in 2002 to around one 
in fifty thousand!  In this case, even if only one in a thousand people ever take a virtual 
reality trip back to 2002, the chances that you are really living in 2002 are still only one 
in fifty.10 
3 Assessments  
 
Of the various ways in which a simulation menace might arise, Modal Realism is the 
most solid.  It requires no second-guessing as to what is scientifically possible, or how 
the future might turn out, and the realm of logical possibility is so vast, so unconstrained, 
that menacing simulations are in inevitably in plentiful supply.  But of course, Modal 
Realism is itself a highly controversial metaphysical doctrine, and few philosophers 
believe it to be true.  That the doctrine entails a significant simulation menace will, for 
many, count as yet another reason for rejecting Modal Realism.   
Somewhat similar considerations apply to scenarios involving multiverses of the 
menacing variety (i.e., those in which are such that it is reasonable to suppose that a 
significant proportion of all conscious lives are simulated).11  Since the relevant physics 
is highly speculative and controversial, it is impossible at present to know how seriously 
theories of this type should be regarded.  Nonetheless, the possibility that our universe 
has the character these theories predict cannot be ruled out, and the same can be said of 
the consequent simulation menace. 
The issues raised by S-simulations are rather different.  Those who have grown 
familiar with the claim that the human brain is the most complex object in the known 
universe may be surprised to discover that it will not be very long before we are able to 
construct machines of comparable complexity and computational power.  But even if this 
is the case – and I suspect it is – the simulation menace posed by advances in computer 
technology is less severe than Bostrom and Tipler would have us believe.  For S-
simulations to constitute a threat they would have to be truly conscious.  It is by no means 
certain that they would be. 
                                                 
10 You might think: ‘A few thousand years from now, would even one in a thousand people bother finding 
out what it was like to live in 2002?  I think not.’  This thought is understandable, but as we shall, there are 
also reasons thinking that the early 21st century might be ‘visited’ more frequently than most. 
11 If a single (non-branching) spacetime were infinite, menacingly large numbers of simulations could 
eventually be created by purely natural processes (e.g., vat-brains would spontaneously emerge from the 
quantum vacuum-field, or be emitted by black-holes – see Bostrom (2002a, 52-3)).  But it is not yet clear 
that our spacetime is large enough for there to be a significant probability that extremely improbable 
occurrences such as these will actually ever occur. 
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 Tipler takes a functionalist-cum-computationalist view of the mind as a given 
(1994, 124-7).  If having a mind involves nothing more than possessing the right kind of 
causal organization, then in principle at least, minds can be implemented in physical (or 
non-physical) systems of radically different kinds, computers included.  Given the way 
functionalists define mental states and properties – in entirely causal-functional terms – 
computers which replicate the causal-functional organization of a human mind simply 
cannot fail to be conscious.  While this view certainly has its advocates, it also has many 
detractors.  The reasons for this are well-known and familiar.  Functionalism entirely 
overlooks, or ignores, the intrinsic qualitative features of experience – the very features 
which provide experiences with their experiential nature!  Confronted with this objection, 
functionalists argue that the qualitative dimension of consciousness is irrelevant or 
illusory, but in the opinion of many, myself included, these heroic arguments are entirely 
unpersuasive.  If functionalism is false, there is no guarantee whatsoever that computer-
based simulations of human minds would be conscious. 
 This said, rejecting functionalism does not entirely eliminate the possibility of 
computer-based consciousness.  Classical Cartesian dualism offers perhaps the most 
secure defence against this possibility, but another form of dualism offers no defence 
whatsoever.  According to the doctrine of ‘non-reductive’ or ‘dualist’ functionalism, 
sympathetically explored by David Chalmers, experiences are non-physical, but they are 
nomologically correlated with functional organization; on this view, computer 
simulations of your brain would generate streams of consciousness indistinguishable 
from your own.12  But as Chalmers himself would concede, non-reductive functionalism 
is at best a possible solution to the matter-consciousness problem.  Materialism is another 
option, one that remains very much alive.  Perhaps phenomenal properties are simply a 
certain kind of material property.  If so, then it may very well be that human-type 
consciousness requires a human-type brain, or at least a biological system of a similar 
kind.13  Of course, we cannot be certain of this.  We do not know which parts or aspects 
of the physical processes in our brains are responsible for producing consciousness; 
consequently, we cannot rule out the possibility that the relevant physical processes could 
be replicated in very different physical systems – perhaps even silicon chips.  But this is 
no more than a possibility, and in all likelihood, one that is quite remote if materialism is 
true. 
 So far as the computational challenge is concerned, the situation is clearly far 
from clear-cut.  Whereas functionalists – of both classical and dualist persuasions – have 
good reasons for being very wary of future developments in computer technology, those 
who subscribe to different options in the philosophy of mind have far less reason to feel 
                                                 
12 ‘I will argue for a principle of organizational invariance, holding that given any system that has 
conscious experiences, then any system that has the same fine-grained functional organization will have 
qualitatively identical experiences … we might call [my doctrine]  nonreductive functionalism.  It might be 
seen as a way of combining functionalism with property dualism.’  Chalmers (1996, 248-9)   Bostrom notes 
that a weak variety of functionalism such as this is all that is required for S-simulations of the sort he 
introduces to pose a significant simulation menace: ‘we need not assume that the thesis of substrate-
independence is necessarily true (either analytically or metaphysically) – just that, in fact, a computer 
running a suitable program would be conscious’ (2002b, 1).  
13 Lockwood (1989), McGinn (1991, 1999), Searle (1992), Strawson (1994) all defend version positions 
which combine materialism with a realist (or non-reductive) view of consciousness. 
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greatly concerned: brain-simulations that are not truly conscious pose no menace 
whatsoever. 
 By contrast, the threat posed by H-simulations looks to be very real indeed, 
irrespective of the position one adopts in the philosophy of mind.  The simulations 
generated by the processes falling under this heading are indisputably streams of 
consciousness, rather than mere computation.  Since the envisaged streams are generated 
by brains, rather than computers, even the most biologically oriented of materialists has 
reason to take their possibility seriously.   
A materialist might argue that brain-computer connections, of the kind required 
for the scenario sketched above, would be so invasive and pervasive that their presence 
inside a brain would be incompatible with the production of conscious experience.  Given 
our ignorance of the physical processes underlying consciousness, this possibility cannot 
be ruled out, but there is also little reason to suppose it very likely.  After all, the 
envisaged interfaces would not replace neurons as experience-producers, they would 
merely provide ways of artificially controlling the triggering of neurons, or neural circuits 
– and we already know this to be possible on a small scale.  Needless to say, the required 
nano-scale technology is far beyond anything we are capable of producing at present, and 
even if we could, our understanding of the brain’s functioning is not sufficiently 
advanced for it to be deployed effectively.  But anyone inclined to think this will continue 
to be the case should bear in mind Arthur C. Clarke’s well-known dictum that any 
sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.  A hundred years ago, 
now-routine procedures such as organ transplants and genetic engineering would have 
seemed miraculous.  Is it not probable that a hundred years from now our descendants 
will be capable of similarly impressive feats? 
It is not only materialists who should be open to the possibility of H-simulations, 
dualists should be too.   
Even if our experiences unfold within immaterial substances, it is evident that our 
minds are profoundly dependent upon our brains.  No contemporary dualist would be 
inclined to deny that the course of our sensory experience is dependent upon the neural 
activity within our brains, and this fact alone opens up the possibility of controlled 
hallucinations of a limited kind.  But dualists should also recognize that appropriate 
neural manipulation could impact upon our conscious beliefs, intentions and desires.  
Intoxicants do not merely make it harder to control our bodily movements, they make it 
harder to think clearly, and there are numerous forms of brain damage that have more far-
reaching (and often permanent) effects on our personalities and cognitive functioning, 
memory included.  If brain damage can result in the permanent loss of certain memories, 
is it not likely that the memories to which we have conscious access depend on 
information stored in our brains?  In which case, appropriate neural manipulation could 
lead a 23rd century person to have access to apparent-memories of the sort a 21st century 
person would have had.   
But there is a further point to note, one that is relevant to materialists as well as 
dualists.  Brain-computer interfaces of the kind I have been considering offer the 
possibility of very tightly controlled hallucinations, but there are undoubtedly other ways 
of inducing similarly life-like H-simulations, even if they offer rather less potential for 
fine-grained control.  Ordinary, unaugmented, human minds are able to fashion richly-
detailed and real-seeming virtual realities all on their own, almost effortlessly.  Ordinary 
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dreams provide evidence both of this, and our ability to spin complex virtual worlds from 
limited and/or fragmentary evidence.  I expect most of us have found ourselves having 
vivid dreams set in (say) the 17th century shortly after watching a film set in the same 
period.  Although the dreamed-environment in such cases is inspired by what was seen 
onscreen, it often has a depth and complexity all of its own.  Future methods of 
experience-induction could easily exploit these ordinary abilities.  All that would be 
required is a safe and reliable drug which enabled people to enter a dream-like state at 
will, and also direct the general direction of the subsequent (fully life-like) hallucination 
– the framework for the latter could be supplied by a little prior reading, or the watching 
of video footage (e.g., of a 21st century televised soap opera).  This method of controlling 
hallucinations could be put to the same uses – in, say, education and entertainment – as 
the computer-driven variant we considered earlier, and so is likely to be widely 
employed.  So far as I can see, this method of inducing (partially) controlled 
hallucinations is not ruled out by any philosophical conception of the mind.  It is also 
quite likely to prove attainable, perhaps quite soon.14 
4. Consequences 
 
Modal realism is metaphysically extravagant, developments in physics may lead to the 
Many-Worlds hypothesis’ being discarded, and the computational conception of mind is 
highly suspect.  But while those who reject these doctrines can take comfort in the idea 
that in so doing they are greatly diminishing the simulation menace, they would be wrong 
to conclude that the latter is non-existent.  As we have seen, there are other ways of 
producing menacing simulations, ways that are harder to rule out.  As one might expect, 
acknowledging the force of the Simulation Argument has a number of consequences; I 
will briefly outline a few of the more significant and intriguing. 
 
WHERE DO WE STAND? 
 
The simulation menace may be real, but it would be premature to suppose that we are all 
living virtual rather than real lives; after all, we do not know how the future will turn out.  
What the Simulation Argument does reveal, on the face of it at least, is a tension between 
the following propositions:  
 
A. Humankind will have a long and successful future. 
 
B. Technology will make it possible to manufacture realistic experiential simulations 
of any known type of human life, and these will be created frequently, in many 
and varied forms. 
 
C. You and I exist in the early 21st century. 
                                                 
14 Might ordinary dreams constitute menacing simulations?  Perhaps, but I am inclined to think not, simply 
because I suspect my dream-experiences are somewhat less vivid and more course-grained than my 
ordinary waking experiences.  I am not alone in this: see Flanagan (2000, 173-4).  Of course, we cannot 
rule out the possibility that we are living in the dream-worlds of beings whose waking consciousness is far 
richer than our own. 
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Neither (A) nor (B) by themselves guarantee a serious simulation menace.  Humankind 
could endure a very long time without ever developing (or deploying) simulation 
technology, hence the need for (B).  But even if simulation technology is available and 
put to widespread and varied use, it may have to be in regular use for very long periods 
before menacing simulations are produced in sufficient numbers to constitute a 
significant threat to those of us living in the early 21st century– if so, (A) will be required 
in addition to (B).  What seems clear is that the more confident you are that (A) and (B) 
are true, the less confident you should be that (C) is true.  Proposition (C) is also in 
tension with: 
 
(D) Modal Realism is true and/or a (menacing form of) multiverse theory is true. 
 
Again, the more confident you are that (D) is true, the less confident you should be that 
(C) is true. 15 
  
DOOMSDAY POSTPONED 
 
As far as (A) is concerned, the Simulation Argument undermines a line of reasoning 
which has led some to believe we humans don’t have a long future ahead of us, and so is 
to this extent self-reinforcing.   
The Doomsday Argument of Brandon, Carter, Gott and Leslie leads to the 
conclusion that the human race may well become extinct in the next hundred years or so.  
Why?  Because you are an ordinary person, in no way untypical, and you find yourself 
alive at the start of the 21st century.  Give your typicality, it is unlikely that you will find 
yourself alive at an exceptional period of human history, such as at a time when only a 
tiny percentage of all the humans who will ever exist are alive.  It is much more likely 
that you will find yourself existing during a period when a when a sizeable percentage of 
all the humans who ever will exist are alive.  Hence it is likely that this is such a time, 
and so unlikely that humankind will have a long and successful future.  Our extinction is 
(probably) just around the corner.  By analogy, suppose you wake up having forgotten 
your surname; it is much more probable that your surname will be found somewhere in 
the middle regions of a telephone directory, where most names are to be found, than on 
the first or last pages.  In a similar fashion, other things being equal, it is more likely that 
an unexceptional person will find themselves being born in the period of history during 
which most other humans can be found. 
The Doomsday reasoning has been criticized on technical grounds; there are those 
who believe the combination of anthropic and statistical reasoning it employs is 
                                                 
15 Bostrom paints a slightly different picture (2002b, 5).  He argues that at least one of the following 
propositions must be true: (1) The probability of humankind becoming extinct in the near future (or never 
developing powerful simulation technology) is close to one.  (2) The probability of our descendants using 
their simulation technology to run ancestor-simulations is close to zero. (3) The probability that you are 
living in a simulation is close to one.  But this only holds for those who share his theoretical commitments.  
Anyone who rejects the computational conception of consciousness could consistently believe that it is 
likely that our descendants will soon have computers capable of running huge numbers of ancestor 
simulations – and so reject both (1) and (2) – but also reject (3), on the grounds that the simulations in 
question will not be conscious, whereas we are. 
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illegitimate.  This issue is complex, and still unresolved.16  However, in the light of the 
preceding considerations, it is clear that even if the reasoning employed in the Doomsday 
Argument were valid, its conclusion would still be questionable, for it rests on a 
questionable premise, namely that your stream of consciousness occurs when it seems, in 
the early 21st century.  Suppose you are optimistic about the prospects of humanity, you 
could reasonably argue thus:  
 
Since I am optimistic about the long-term prospects for humankind, the 
Simulation Argument leads me to believe that it is more likely than not that my 
stream of consciousness actually exists at a time later than the early 21st century, 
at some point in a (long) period during which the bulk of all the human-like 
streams of consciousness that ever occur do occur.  This is precisely what the 
Doomsday reasoning predicts.  Hence the Doomsday reasoning – in itself – does 
not provide me with any reason for reducing the probability I assign to the 
proposition ‘Humanity will have a long and successful future’. 
 
Propounders of the Doomsday Argument aim to persuade us that we (as a species) are 
less likely to have a long future than we (as individuals) would otherwise have thought.  
But if you find yourself believing it likely that humankind will have a long and successful 
future, the Simulation Argument should lead you to conclude that it is quite likely that 
you actually exist in the future (or at a time subsequent to the early 21st century), and 
since this is not at all a remarkable time to exist (assuming humankind endures for a long 
time), there is no reason for the Doomsday reasoning to affect your optimism about 
humankind’s long-term prospects. 
 
EXTINCTION MAY NOT SAVE US 
 
Taking a broader, less parochial view, even if humankind were to become extinct in the 
comparatively near future – or survives but never develops (or deploys) simulation 
technology – it might not matter, for you and I could still be leading virtual rather than 
real lives.  Modal Realism provides one route to this conclusion, as do certain multiverse 
scenarios, but there at least one further route: menacing simulations could be created by 
extraterrestrial civilizations. 
There is no need for aliens ever to visit Earth.  The information needed to 
generate simulations of human experience is even now starting to be broadcast to the 
stars, and this will no doubt continue for the next few years – or until our extinction 
invervenes.17  Any alien listening post within a few dozen light-years of the Sun would be 
in a position to detect even fairly weak radio signals emanating from the Earth which, 
when decoded, would provide a detailed knowledge of our physical constitution (e.g., a 
                                                 
16 Korb and Oliver (1998), Bostrom (1999), (2002a). 
17 The BBC’s radio broadcasts from the 1936 Berlin Olympics were probably the first signals with the right 
wavelength to penetrate the ionosphere and sufficient strength to be detected in interstellar space; many 
more have been transmitted subsequently.  In 1974 a simple message was directed at a globular cluster of 
some 300,000 stars with the intention of revealing our presence (but it will not be received for another 
25,000 years or so).  This idea is not new: as long ago as 1820 Gauss suggested carving mathematically 
meaningful patterns in the Siberian forests so as to alert extraterrestrials to our existence. (Drake and Sobel, 
1991, 170) 
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typical human DNA sequence, which no doubt will soon be broadcast, if it hasn’t been 
already) and our ways of life (e.g., radio talk shows, televised soap operas).  This 
knowledge could, in principle at least, be transmitted to the alien home-worlds and used 
to generate simulations of typical human streams of consciousness.  The fact that these  
worlds might be so distant that signals traveling at light-speed from our neighbourhood 
would take thousands (or millions) of years to arrive is of no consequence so far as the 
possible production of simulations is concerned – likewise the possibility that humankind 
might be extinct before the signals arrive. 
This possibility, and others of the same ilk, should be of greatest concern to 
computationalists.  Given the sort of information about ourselves we will shortly be 
providing, a technologically advanced alien species should have no difficulty in creating 
and running structurally accurate S-simulations of ordinary human beings, and ordinary 
human life.  If simulations such as these would conscious in our computers, as 
computationalists believe, there is no reason to suppose they would not be conscious in 
their computers.  It is not difficult to envisage scenarios in which human-type simulations 
are created in sufficient numbers so as to become menacing (e.g., alien historians might 
run a good many full-scale exploratory simulations of the period of human civilization in 
the period leading up to its demise, varying parameters to see how this unfortunate 
occurrence could have been averted).   
Materialists and dualists have rather less to worry about, but neither camp should 
rule out this possibility: aliens could use the information about ourselves that we are 
transmitting to create approximations of human experience in controlled hallucinations.18  
It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that your current experience is a reflection of 
human life viewed through the (inevitably) distorting lens of a non-human consciousness. 
 These speculations may strike some readers as particularly extravagant.19  But 
don’t forget: there are thousands of billions of stars in our galaxy, and billions of other 
galaxies.  Even if intelligent life is very uncommon, there may still be a lot of it out there, 
and since time and distance are not pressing factors so far as simulation (as opposed to 
communication) is concerned, a significant simulation menace from these quarters cannot 
be ruled out. 
 
EVIL 
 
The Simulation Argument goes some way towards providing a solution to the traditional 
Problem of Evil.  The problem is not ‘How could an omnipotent and benevolent God 
create a universe where bad things happen to some people’ – given free will, some people 
will, on occasion, choose to act in ways which result in other people suffering.  The 
problem is rather this: ‘How could an omnipotent and benevolent God create a universe 
where there’s so much pointless suffering, suffering that results from natural causes, 
rather than the actions of free agents.’  But if your current life is a virtual life, then it 
                                                 
18 These approximations need not be based on information gleaned from us.  Aliens thoroughly acquainted 
with the relationship between material and phenomenal processes might simply simulate the sort of 
experience available to DNA based life-forms as part of a general investigation into the possible forms of 
experience.  Thanks to Nick Bostrom for this suggestion. 
19 Of course, they merely involve the logical extension of a technique which features prominently in the 
Jurassic Park movies – see Crichton (1991). 
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could well be that the universe as a whole has (proportionally) a lot less pointless 
suffering than your virtual universe.  Perhaps the unpleasantness to be found in the latter 
is due to the free choices made by some future (not very moral) human – the person who 
set up the parameters of the virtual world you inhabit – hence God is not directly 
responsible for the unpleasantness in question.  The Simulation Argument thus provides 
an unexpected boost to the Free Will solution to the Problem of Evil. 
 
A NEW SCEPTICISM 
 
The Simulation Argument can be viewed as a posing a sceptical challenge, but the 
scepticism involved is of a novel kind.  Ancient Greek sceptics argued that since our 
senses can deceive us we can never be justified in supposing that the world is how it 
seems, but the idea that there might not even be an external world never occurred to 
them.20  For the latter hypothesis to be thinkable consciousness must be construed as a 
self-contained and potentially autonomous realm of existence in its own right.  Descartes 
was the first to articulate this conception clearly, and drew the (now) obvious sceptical 
conclusion: our experience could be (subjectively) just as it is even if the reality external 
to our consciousness is very different from how we believe it to be on the basis of our 
experience, and consequently, we cannot be certain that the physical world exists.  
Simulation scepticism (as we might as well call it) involves a rather different 
claim: 
 
Even if there is an external physical world, and this world has the character 
suggested by our experience, it is not only possible, but quite likely (given certain 
assumptions) that our current experience is hallucinatory rather than veridical. 
 
So far as the existence of a mind-independent reality is concerned, Simulation sceptics 
are as one with their Greek predecessors: it exists.  But Simulation sceptics are at one 
with Cartesian sceptics when it comes to the status of our current consciousness: both 
hold that it could be purely virtual, a detailed and convincing hallucination.  However, for 
the Cartesian this conclusion relies on the reality external to our consciousness being very 
different from how it appears (e.g., a malicious Demon).  Simulation sceptics, by 
contrast, derive this conclusion from the assumption that our experience is an accurate 
guide to the character of that portion of the external reality it seems to concern (in our 
case, the early 21st century). 
 Simulation scepticism is less radical than its Cartesian counterpart, but it is also 
less of a blind alley.  Different hypotheses as to how the future may turn out, or what the 
universe may contain, render the hypothesis that we are leading virtual rather than real 
lives more or less likely, and these hypotheses can be refined, explored and evaluated.  
Unfortunately, this gain comes at a price.  The threat posed by Simulation scepticism is 
far more real than that posed by its predecessors.  Cartesian scepticism is hard to refute, 
but as Hume noted, it is also hard to take seriously: few of us spend much time worrying 
about the possibility that reality could be radically different from how it seems.  
Simulation scepticism reveals that even if reality is largely as we believe it to be, there 
could be a high probability that our actual condition is very different from our apparent 
                                                 
20 Or so it has been argued, cf. Burnyeat (1982) 
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condition.  As things stand, with simulation technology still at a primitive level, many 
will find Simulation scepticism as hard to take seriously as its Cartesian counterpart.  
This will no doubt change, as the technology advances. 
 Would taking Simulation scepticism seriously have any practical implications for 
how we should lead our lives?  Like other modes of scepticism it has the potential to 
console.  Anyone who has had cause to regret an action because of its consequences – 
and that includes most of us – will be cheered by the thought that these consequences 
might not in fact be real.  The downside of this is that the same might apply to some of 
our most valued achievements and relationships.  But since simulations come in different 
forms, and we cannot be certain that our lives are simulated, it would clearly be wrong to 
abandon all one’s ambitions, or act without giving thought to the consequences. 
Simulation scepticism differs from its kin in one further respect.  Whereas 
everyone is equally vulnerable to Cartesian doubt, Simulation scepticism has the potential 
to be more discriminating.  Anyone who thinks they are living an especially interesting 
life, and so having experiences which future simulators might be interested in sharing, 
will be led to the conclusion that their life has a greater than average chance of being 
virtual.  It is hard to predict what effects this realization might have on (say) political 
leaders of the future, but they may not be wholly beneficial.   
For those of us living only average lives, I suspect the practical consequences of 
Simulation scepticism will prove to be few.  Even if we knew the probability of our lives 
being simulated, which we don’t, this knowledge would be useless unless we also knew 
what sort of simulation was being run and the intentions and preferences of the 
simulators.21  Until such knowledge is forthcoming, it seems best to continue much as we 
would otherwise do.  Also, as Bostrom notes: ‘Our best guide to how our … creators 
have chosen to set up our world is the standard empirical study of the universe we see’ 
(2002b, 7).  This seems right.   
Not everyone will view simulation as a threat or menace.  Despite the potential 
losses, there are people who would welcome the prospect of their current lives being 
virtual: there are many who would gladly exchange a life in the 21st century for a life in a 
later century, and all the wonders there to be found.  This attitude is comprehensible, but 
a few cautionary words are in order.  Only H-simulations offer this prospect, S-
simulations do not.  Also, H-simulations are themselves far from risk-free.  If you were to 
emerge from your simulated 21st century life at a later time (or different world), you 
might well find that your 21st century personality was as much a simulation as your 21st 
century surroundings.22  Moreover, you may find your new (non-virtual) circumstances 
                                                 
21 The difficulty of attempting to second-guess the likely preferences of simulators is illustrated by 
Hanson’s (2002) recommendations as to how one should act so as to reduce the risk of the curtains being 
brought down on one’s virtual world.  He concludes thus: ‘If you might be living in a simulation then all 
else equal it seems that you should care less about others, live more for today, make your world look likely 
to become eventually rich, expect to and try to participate in pivotal events, be entertaining and 
praiseworthy, and keep the famous people around you happy and interested in you.’  I am not sure that 
anyone could conform to all these injunctions simultaneously, but even attempting to do so might well 
make one so obnoxious as to hasten one’s end. 
22 On some views of personal identity, radical psychological discontinuity (sudden memory loss or change, 
etc.) cannot be survived, so the person ‘emerging’ from you simulation would not be you.  See Dainton 
(1995) for an entirely consciousness-based account of personal identity which does not have this 
consequence. 
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might leave much to be desired.  After all, it is likely to remain the case that many of 
those inclined to indulge in simulatory practices will do so because they are less than 
fully satisfied with the circumstances in which they find themselves.   
 
SOME VARIETIES OF VIRTUAL LIFE 
 
The distinction between H-simulations and S-simulations reveals one way in which 
simulated lives can be subjectively indistinguishable but different in kind.  Here are some 
others:  
 
Active v. Passive (A-simulations v. P-simulations)  The subjects of A-
simulations are confined to virtual environments, but in all other respects they are 
free agents – or as free as any agent can be.  Their actions are not dictated by the 
virtual-reality program, they flow from their own individual psychologies, even if 
these are machine-implemented.  A P-simulation, by contrast, is a completely pre-
programmed course of experiences.  The subjects of P-simulations may have the 
impression that they are autonomous individuals making free choices, but unlike 
their A-simulation counterparts, they are deluded: all their conscious decisions are 
determined in advance by the virtual reality program.  Such subjects have 
apparent psychologies – their consciousness is subjectively similar to that of 
someone with an active psychological system, so they have apparent memories, 
hopes, fears, etc. – but their real psychologies are entirely suppressed (or even 
non-existent). 
 
Original Psychology v. Replacement Psychology (simulationsOP v. 
simulationsRP)  In A-simulations, a ‘replacement psychology’ is an artificially-
generated system of beliefs, desires, memories, intentions, preferences, 
personality traits and so forth that supplants a subject’s own (‘original’) 
psychology.  The same applies in P-simulations, the difference being that the 
‘replacement’ psychology is only apparent, in the sense just introduced.  There is 
a sense in which the inhabitants of simulationsRP are doubly deceived: not only is 
their environment not what it seems, neither are their minds.  Obviously, the 
‘original’ v. ‘replacement’ distinction only applies to subjects who have (or once 
had) a non-virtual life; the psychologies of subjects who only exist in virtual 
worlds are ‘original’ without exception. 
 
Communal v. Individual (C-simulations v. I-simulations)  A C-simulation is a 
virtual environment shared by a number of different subjects, each possessing 
their own distinctive individual psychology (even if these are machine-
implemented).  An  I-simulation is restricted to a single subject.  Of course, the 
subject of an I-simulation may meet what they take to be other people in their 
virtual worlds, but these ‘others’ do not possess their own individual autonomous 
psychological systems – they are not subjects in their own right, merely parts of a 
machine-generated virtual environment. 
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These options can be combined in various ways, e.g., a simulation of type ACRP is active, 
communal with replacement psychology, whereas a simulation of type PIOP is passive, 
individual with original psychology.  There is a total of eight permutations: 
 
AIOP:  Active/Individual/Original Psychology 
AIRP: Active/Individual/Replacement Psychology 
 
ACOP: Active/Communal/Original Psychology 
ACRP: Active/Communal/Replacement Psychology 
 
PIOP: Passive/Individual/Original Psychology 
PIRP: Passive/Individual/Replacement Psychology 
 
PCOP: Passive/Communal/Original Psychology 
PCRP: Passive/Communal/Replacement Psychology 
 
Assuming that each of these modes could be generated by either H-methods or S-
methods, we have a grand total of sixteen distinct kinds of (subjectively 
indistinguishable) virtual life. But the situation may not be quite so complex.  A strong 
case can be made for thinking that a truly communal simulation of the passive variety is 
impossible.  There is nothing impossible in the idea of a number of subjects 
simultaneously playing out roles in similar and coordinated hallucinations, but unless 
these subjects can causally interact with one another – something which cannot occur in 
P-simulations – they can scarcely be said to constitute a genuine community.  For this 
reason it seems right to regard all P-simulations to be of the individual variety.  This 
brings our grand total down to twelve.23 
 
THE VIRTUAL AND THE REAL 
 
Although I have been contrasting real and virtual modes of existence, some virtual 
realities are more real than others.  Subjects inhabiting I-simulations – whether active or 
passive – are in a similar predicament to people suffering lasting and life-like delusions.  
Their environments may seem perfectly real, but they do not extend beyond the confines 
of their consciousness.  The environments of the inhabitants of C-simulations are very 
different: they are shared, rather than private, and so well-founded distinctions can be 
drawn between ‘appearance and reality’ (and ‘objective and subjective’).  C-simulants 
can conduct empirical explorations of their virtual world, and agree and disagree on their 
findings, in all the ways available to the inhabitants of non-virtual worlds.  Earlier, I 
characterized Simulation scepticism thus: ‘even if there is an external physical world, and 
this world has the character suggested by our experience, it may be quite likely that our 
                                                 
23 To simplify, I overlook here the fact that the distinction between H-simulations and S-simulations may 
not be absolute: the consciousness of future humans (or post-humans) may be sustained by a combination 
of neural and artificial means, and neurons themselves may be genetically manipulated.  I also ignore the 
fact that in some logically possible worlds, simulations are created by quite different means (e.g. magic).  It 
should also be noted that simulants of different types can coexist, e.g., The Matrix features a combination 
of H-simulations (ordinary humans) and S-simulations (the ‘agents’), both active, coexisting in a single C-
type virtual environment. 
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current experience is hallucinatory’.  We are now in a position to see that this requires 
qualification.  The experiences of subjects inhabiting I-simulations is hallucinatory, in the 
usual sense of the term, but the predicament of those inhabiting C-simulations is less 
straightforward.  Although their perceptual experience does not in fact reveal the real 
world (as they naively suppose), it does reveal a world which possesses at least some of 
the defining properties of ‘reality’. 
 
In Kantian terms, virtual worlds of the communal variety are empirically real, 
even if transcendentally ideal.  The Simulation Argument thus injects new life into the 
Kantian claim that our world – the world we perceive and interact with – is no more than 
‘empirically’ real.  But bearing in mind the possibility that many simulations are I-type 
rather than C-type, our world(s) may also be less than empirically real, despite 
appearances to the contrary. 
 
SIMULATION ETHICS 
 
Since simulated lives are subjectively indistinguishable from the real thing, their creation 
is by no means a trifling matter, morally speaking.  Even if our descendants develop the 
means of producing such simulations, might they choose not to do so?  Might ethical 
scruples eliminate or at least diminish the threat posed by the Simulation Argument?  It is 
hard to be sure – our descendants may be swayed by moral considerations we cannot now 
anticipate – nonetheless, there are reasons for thinking it unlikely. 
It is easy to conceive of morally abhorrent simulations.  An obvious example 
would be S-simulations of entire virtual worlds, of the sort computationalists believe 
possible, all of whose inhabitants suffer nothing but perpetual pointless torment.  It is far 
from inconceivable that our descendants will forbear from creating such things; after all, 
ways might be found of controlling, or eliminating, the malicious tendencies which 
plague contemporary societies.  But not all large-scale simulations are clearly morally 
abhorrent, far from it.  Would creating an ancestor-simulation – a complete simulation of 
human-history up until the present time – be morally wrong?  It is not at all obvious that 
it would.  The sum total of human misery may be immense, but so too is the sum total of 
human happiness, and on balance, most people are glad to have had the opportunity of 
existing.  Given this, what could be immoral about creating ancestor-simulations?  Since 
the inhabitants of an ancestor-simulation would feel the same way about their lives as we 
do about ours, mightn’t it be immoral not to create ancestor-simulations, if one had the 
means of so doing? 
But the situation is by no means this straightforward.  The fact that simulations 
need not be unpleasant does not mean their creation is morally unproblematic: 
 
The Objection from Lesser Value  A real life has greater intrinsic value than a 
subjectively similar simulated life.  Since it is wrong to impose on others a low-
grade form of existence that one would prefer to avoid oneself, the creation of 
simulated lives is immoral. 
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This objection is weak.  Even if virtual lives do possess less intrinsic value than their 
non-virtual counterparts, other things being equal, they can still be lives worth living, and 
hence lives that are worth creating.  But there is a second point to note.   
As Nozick’s imaginary case of the experience machine reveals, the desirability of 
a life is not determined solely by the desirability of the experiences it contains.  An 
experience machine will supply you with a (virtual) life of any kind you like, so by 
connecting yourself up to such a device you are guaranteed a very enjoyable (virtual) life, 
a life in which as many of your desires as you choose to come true will come true.  But as 
Nozick notes, few of us would choose permanently to connect ourselves to an experience 
machine if we had the opportunity of so doing, and for good reason: ‘What is most 
disturbing about them is their living of our lives for us.’ (1980, 44)  This lesson is 
important.  But it is also of limited relevance. 
The virtual lives sustained by experience machines are of the passive kind: they 
consist of solitary streams of consciousness that are completely controlled and pre-
programmed.  As we have seen, not all virtual lives need be like this.  Of particular 
interest here are AC-simulations, i.e., virtual lives that are both active and communal, in 
the senses introduced above.  Subjects in AC-simulations possess their own autonomous 
psychologies (whether original or replacement).  They lead their own lives: their actions 
are not pre-programmed (they are as free as anyone can be).  And they can causally 
interact with other subjects in their virtual environment (and these other subjects are 
autonomous individuals in their own right, rather than merely the appearances of such).  
Given all this, it is hard to see why life in an AC-simulation should be regarded as being 
inherently less valuable or worthwhile than a normal life.  True, the inhabitants of AC-
simulations are not physically embodied in the normal way, but they possess virtual 
bodies that are indistinguishable from the real thing.  They are unable to manipulate 
physical objects, but they can manipulate virtual objects which seem physical.  Why 
should the undetectable absence of a material environment significantly diminish the 
value of the lives of these subjects?  I cannot see any reason why it should.24  
These considerations further weaken the Objection from Lesser Value.  Even 
those who find this objection persuasive would only have reason to avoid creating 
passive simulations; there is no reason why they should be reluctant to create AC-
simulations. 
However, there is a further, and potentially more serious objection to the fostering 
of virtual life:  
 
The Deception Objection  The subjects of simulations are being deliberately 
deceived; their lives are virtual, but they believe them to be real.  This deception 
is engineered and maintained by the relevant simulators.  Such actions are clearly 
wrong. 
 
Deception is not an inevitable consequence of simulation; there may well be simulants 
who are perfectly aware of their true condition.  But since few contemporary humans 
believe themselves to be leading simulated lives, the Deception Objection does apply to 
                                                 
24 Berkeley, who believed that we all have virtual lives (organized and coordinated by God) was perhaps 
the first to make this point, when he argued for the redundancy of mind-independent material reality.  For 
an interesting fictional depiction of what life in an AC-simulation might be like see Egan (1998). 
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simulations of the menacing variety.  This is not to say that it will have an impact on 
simulation policy.  It is conceivable that future simulators will take the view that although 
deception is wrong, the kind of deception being perpetrated on simulants does not 
constitute a wrong that is sufficiently serious to outweigh the boon of existence.  But 
equally, it is conceivable that future simulators will be swayed by the Deception 
Objection, and restrict their simulation activities accordingly.  This may not seem likely, 
but since we can only guess at the ways ethical considerations will influence the 
simulation policies of our descendants, it cannot be ruled out. 
 However, it would be wrong to suppose Deception Objection has equal force 
against simulations of different types.  It has considerable force in the context of long-
term S-simulations of entire civilizations: anyone who creates an ancestor-simulation is 
responsible for the deceiving of billions of (virtual) people for thousands of (subjective) 
years.  The situation is very different in the case of small-scale, short-term H-simulations.   
You are, let us suppose, feeling run-down by the demands of your 22nd century job, and 
decide to spend a couple of days in the (virtual) past to unwind; you employ the method 
of self-induced controlled hallucination, and ‘wake up’ in early 19th century England, in 
the midst of the Napoleonic wars.  As you enjoy your adventure, are you the victim of a 
deliberate deception?  In a sense, yes: you have opted for the fully-immersive trip, and so 
believe yourself to be a typical early 19th century person.  But is the kind of deception 
involved in this case morally problematic?  Surely not.  Rather than one person imposing 
an uninvited delusion on another – as in the case of ancestor-simulations – we are dealing 
here with a person freely choosing to impose a short-term and harmless delusion upon 
themselves.  Where is the wrong in that? 
 This implications of this point are by no means trivial, for as we saw earlier, given 
sufficient time, H-simulations might easily be created in sufficient numbers so as to be 
seriously menacing.  But we are not yet done.  There is at least one further reason why 
our descendants might avoid indulging in menacing simulatory practices, a reason that is 
pragmatic rather than ethical:  
  
The Self-Interest Consideration  Future generations will be well acquainted 
with the Simulation Argument, and so will impose tight restrictions on simulation 
creation.  They will realize that unless such restrictions are imposed, and 
enforced, no one – themselves included – will be in a position to rule out the 
likelihood that their lives are virtual rather than real. 
 
I am not confident that such a policy will ever be adopted, for a number of reasons.  (1) 
Simulation technology is certain to play an increasing role in recreational activities, and 
people will become accustomed to, and demand, ever more lifelike simulations – just as 
today there is a demand for every more life-like computer games.  Since a ban on lifelike 
simulations would be unpopular with both the public and powerful commercial concerns, 
the prospects of one’s being implemented are slim.  (2) Most people will be unlikely to 
take the Simulation Argument seriously until they themselves have experienced what the 
technology can do, and taken a fully-immersive trip to the past or future.  Should this 
point every be reached, billions of menacing simulations will have been created, and it 
will be obvious to everyone that it is already too late to consider a ban.  (3) To have the 
desired effect, a ban on simulations would have to be continued into the indefinite future.  
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But even if an effective ban could be enforced in the present, we could never be confident 
that this policy would not be abandoned, or fail, at some future date.  For this reason 
alone it is unlikely that our descendants would be willing to deprive themselves of all the 
benefits advanced simulation technology makes available. 
There is a more general point.  We are in the process of emerging from an age of 
innocence, an innocence that we are unlikely ever to recapture.  Innocence was being able 
to believe that only sceptical possibilities of the most radical sort stood between ourselves 
and the world about us.  This innocence evaporates on contact with the knowledge that 
even if reality is much as it seems, there is a significant likelihood that our current 
consciousness is simulated.  Having to live with this knowledge may well be part of the 
normal lot of technologically advanced conscious beings the universe over.  When this 
realization fully dawns on our descendants, attempting to recapture their lost innocence 
by imposing restrictions on simulatory practices will very likely strike them as futile.  
Since any restrictions on simulation creation can always be lifted subsequently, it will be 
obvious that their imposition would offer only meagre protection against the menace of 
simulation.  But another factor will enter into the reckoning.  Even if innocence once lost 
is impossible to regain, innocence can of course be simulated.  If our descendants want to 
escape the shadow of simulation and experience for themselves what it was like to exist 
in more innocent times, they may have but one option: to embark on fully immersive 
virtual reality trips into the past.  Not only does this further reduce the chances of 
restrictions on simulation creation being imposed, it is also bad news for our 
predecessors.  It could easily be that the vast majority of people who find themselves 
living in more innocent times are simulants. 
Our own predicament is only slightly better.  Many of our descendants might be 
tempted by the prospect of finding out what it was like to become aware of the simulation 
menace; experiencing the first falling of the shadow might be irresistibly appealing 
prospect.  If so, life in the early 21st century may be an even more fragile thing than it 
appears.25 
 
 
         
                                                 
25 And you may feel it unwise to dwell on these matters further.  My thanks (so far) to: Tim Bayne, Nick 
Bostrom and Stephen Clark. 
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